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1. A Union in crisis: the last years of  European politics 
The European Union (hereinafter, EU) is experiencing times of  great uncertainty. 
The 2008 financial crisis temporarily damaged the European economy but, more than 
that, it may have permanently hurt its spirit. The economic recovery – at a slower pace 
in the periphery countries – did nothing to mend the spiritual damage. Even before 
the financial crisis, other events started the EU’s “existential crisis”,3 like the failure of  
the European Constitution due to its rejection in the French and Dutch referendums. 
Recently, the refugee crisis and a plethora of  terrorist attacks further complicated the 
situation. Moreover, the EU is losing a Member State for the first time in its history and 
may face hostility from the current American administration.  
The periphery countries were particularly ravaged by the effects of  the financial 
crisis. The derogatory designation of  “P.I.G.S” was attributed to the most affected 
States (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Among those, the Greek situation was 
particularly serious. Economic adjustment programmes had to be implemented 
when the severe increase in the spread of  government bonds made these countries 
unable to secure financing in the international markets. The Portuguese economic 
adjustment programme, the “Memorandum of  Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality”,4 whose signatories were Portugal, the European Commission 
(EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
required deep structural reforms. Some of  these reforms were successful like the 
flexibilization of  the public sector, while others failed catastrophically and contributed 
for the depopulation of  the country’s interior and originated more social and economic 
inequality. 16,2% of  the workforce was unemployed in 2013.5 The emigration of  
highly qualified young professionals, who could easily find abroad the professional 
opportunities that Portugal was not able to provide, became a pressing issue for the 
country. Portuguese citizens became outraged by the successive downgrades to the 
credit ranking of  the national debt. When it fell to speculative-grade or “junk status” 
a group of  Portuguese hackers hacked the Moody’s website6 and a video was prepared 
to explain to the rating agencies and to the United States President Barack Obama why 
“Portugal is not junk”.7 In the academy, a question arose: “Is austerity the cure… or 
the disease?”.8 
In the EU, the southern countries were satirised as poor and lazy in contrast with 
the hard-working and rich northern countries.9 The values of  European loyalty and 
3 The “diagnosis” comes from the President of  the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
himself, in his 2016 State of  the Union Address. See “Speech: State of  the Union Address 2016: 
Towards a better Europe – a Europe that protects, empowers and defends”, European Commission, 
accessed Mar 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm. 
4 See “Memorandum of  Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality”, European 
Commission, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/
mou/2011-05-18-mou-portugal_en.pdf. 
5 See “Unemployment rate: total and by sex (%)”, Pordata, accessed Mar. 3, 2017, http://www.pordata.
pt/en/Portugal/Unemployment+rate+total+and+by+sex+(percentage)-550. 
6 See João Pedro Pereira, “‘Cidadãos portugueses’ usam site da Moody’s para mensagem provocatória”, 
Público, July 7 2011, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.publico.pt/2011/07/07/economia/noticia/
cidadaos-portugueses-usam-site-da-moodys-para-mensagem-provocatoria-1501890. 
7 See “Portugal não é lixo”, Unattributed Author, accessed Mar 3, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1aZ1ZyGRjiM, accessed 3 Mar 2017. 
8 See Eduardo Paz Ferreira, A Austeridade Cura... A Austeridade Mata?(Lisboa: AAFDL, 2016). 
9 See Eduardo Paz Ferreira, “Endividamento e Soberania Nacional”, in A Crise e o Direito, eds. Jorge 
Bacelar Gouveia e Nuno Piçarra (Coimbra: Almedina, 2013), 121-135. 
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solidarity became secondary in the face of  economic hardships. The free movement of  
persons, goods, services and capital (four fundamental freedoms) are at the very core 
of  the EU’s spirit and are enshrined in both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU). However, anti-EU 
forces in the northern countries cultivated the idea that the citizens of  the southern and 
eastern countries would “steal their jobs”. A new wave of  nationalism and populism 
emerged masterfully using the EU and the other Member States as scapegoats for 
national issues. In the “poor” countries, the EU was the “enemy” because of  the 
austerity measures it had forced on them. On the other hand, in the “rich” countries, 
the EU was the “enemy” because it allowed the immigrants from the “poor” countries 
to enter unrestricted.
The “regressive tendency”10 in the most recent case law of  the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union (CJEU) reflects the uncertainty of  the times. The CJEU’s 
decisions in Dano or Alimanovic appear to be a step back from Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk 
and Zambrano,11 where European Citizenship is concerned.
There is also a heated debate between Eurosceptics and integrationists regarding 
the existence of  a democratic deficit in the EU. Nigel Farage frequently accused the EU 
of  being undemocratic in the campaign for the referendum in the United Kingdom 
(UK). When discussing this issue, the most avid integrationists usually invoke a seemingly 
irreproachable formal argument: the MPEs are elected to the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage (Art. 14, 3, TEU). Second, both the European Council and 
the Council of  the European Union are elected in their Member States [Arts. 15(2) 
and 16(2) TUE] and the President of  the European Commission is proposed by the 
European Council “taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having 
held the appropriate consultations” and is “elected” in the European Parliament “by a majority of  
its component members” [Art. 17(7), TEU]. In theory, the argument is flawless. In practice, 
it is deeply flawed. The fact is that there is only one true European election, and from 
that election, four “democratic” institutions materialise. These institutions have the 
monopoly on the legislative and executive power in the EU. By comparison, in the US, 
at a federal level, there are separate elections for both houses of  Congress and for the 
President of  the United States. We believe that the Commission would greatly benefit 
from the additional legitimacy of  a President that is directly elected by the citizens, 
like his American counterpart.12 We should also keep in mind that the influence of  the 
European Council may go beyond what is enshrined in the Article 15, 1, TEU.13
10 See J. N. Cunha Rodrigues, “As Comunidades de 1986 e a União de 2016”, in União 
Europeia: Reforma ou Declínio?, ed. Eduardo Paz Ferreira (Lisboa: Vega, 2016), 19-
33;  Alessandra Silveira, “Cidadania Social na União Europeia – quo vadis? Avanços e 
recuos entre forças de coesão e fragmentação”, in União Europeia: Reforma…, 293-310. 
11 See Judgment of  11 Nov. 2014, Dano, C-333/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358; Judgment of  15 Sep. 
2015, Alimanovic, C-67/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597; Judgment of  12 May 1998, Martinez Sala, C-85/96, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:217; Judgment of  20 Sep. 2001, Grzelczyk, C-184/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458; Judgment 
of  8 Mar. 2011, Zambrano, C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
12 In the 2015 Riga summit, Juncker greeted the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán with a good-
humoured “Hello, dictator”. Even if  one dislikes Orbán’s policies, it is still an ironic situation: Juncker 
who is not directly elected by the citizens labelling Orbán as a dictator. See “‘Hello, dictator’: European 
commission president jokes with Hungarian PM”, The Guardian, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/may/22/hello-dictator-european-commission-president-
juncker-jokes-hungarian-orban-video. 
13 See Paulo de Pitta e Cunha, “Comentário ao art.º 13.º”, in Tratado de Lisboa: Anotado e Comentado, eds. 
Manual Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012),63-65.  
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On 16 February, 2017, two highly relevant resolutions14 were approved by the 
European Parliament. The first, drafted by the MEPs Elmar Brok (PPE) and Mercedes 
Bresso (S&D),15 proposes the transformation of  the Council of  the European Union 
in a “second legislative chamber” (point 29) and a more frequent use of  the “passerelle rule” 
[Art. 48(7) TEU]. We could go further than this resolution and replace the Council 
of  the European Union with a Senate elected by direct universal suffrage. Currently, 
the Council of  the European Union consists “of  a representative of  each Member State at 
ministerial level”. This scenario raises two very serious issues: i) the vast majority of  the 
voters elect those representatives for the national government without even knowing 
that they are also electing them for the Council of  the European Union. This is to be 
expected since national issues are a more pressing concern in the minds of  the voters, 
thus the focus of  most national political campaigns. However, one could argue that the 
representatives’ democratic legitimacy in the EU is weakened since democracy should 
reflect “the will of  the people”.  Furthermore, even if  the voter is taking into consideration 
the election for the Council of  the European Union, the method is undemocratic by 
design. A candidate may be an excellent pick for finance minister but the voter may 
find him a poor negotiator that should not represent the country in the Council of  the 
European Union. This puts the voter in a “no win” situation, since he may either have 
an excellent finance minister or an excellent negotiator, never both, because they are 
voted as a package. In Member States where the government has no legislative powers, 
or has its legislative power restricted the issue is even more complicated. It does not 
seem reasonable for the EU to give the national representatives legislative powers when 
they do not have them in their own countries. It might even endanger the separation of  
powers in those Member States. A proper Senate would also contribute to the proximity 
between the voter and its elected representative in the EU. The second resolution, 
drafted by the MPE Guy Verhofstadt (ADLE),16 proposes a structural reform17 from 
where we would highlight: ii) the attribution of  the right of  legislative initiative to the 
European Parliament (point 62); ending “Europe à la carte” (points 6 through 12); iii) 
the “undertaking [of] a comprehensive, in-depth review of  the Lisbon Treaty”.
The White Paper on the future of  Europe published by the European Commission 
on 1 March, 2017, forming the Commission’s contribution to the Rome Summit of  25 
March 2017, lists five possible scenarios for maintaining the Unity of  “the EU at 27”.18 
The possible scenarios for the evolution of  the EU until 2025 per the Commission are: 
i) “carrying on” – this scenario basically maintains the status quo; ii) “nothing but the single 
market” – the most Eurosceptic solution which keeps the single market and removes 
everything else; iii) “those who want more do more” – the multi-speed Europe scenario: the 
14 Even if  due to their nature, the resolutions of  the European Parliament have limited importance.
15 See “European Parliament resolution of  16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of  the 
European Union building on the potential of  the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI))”, European 
Parliament, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&lan
guage=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0049. 
16 See “European Parliament resolution of  16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of  and 
adjustments to the current institutional set-up of  the European Union (2014/2248(INI))”, European 
Parliament, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//
EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0048+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
17 The implementation of  some of  the proposals in the resolution would require amendments in the 
TEU and TFEU. 
18 See “Commission presents White Paper on the future of  Europe: Avenues for unity for the EU 
at 27”, European Commission, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
385_en.htm. 
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Member States may integrate at their own pace;19 iv) “doing less more efficiently” – the EU 
intervenes less but in a more effective and united manner; v) “doing much more together” – 
further integration and a more interventive EU. All the Member States commit equally. 
The lack of  substance in the “White Paper” is truly disappointing. The Commission lists 
the possible scenarios for the future that were already known to the public, offering no 
contribution or new path to the EU’s development.
2. 2016 in two chapters
Two events in the year of  2016 changed the World’s political landscape: “Leave’s” 
victory in the “United Kingdom European Union membership referendum” and Donald 
Trump’s victory in the United States Presidential Election. Usually, the discussion of  
these events focused on finding out “how” and “how much” these events will change the 
status quo. However, one should not forget that these events already changed the status 
quo and are themselves, a reflection of  previous changes in our world. Therefore, it 
is of  extreme importance that we first understand the past and present if  we wish to 
predict the future.
2.1. Chapter I: until the referendum tears us apart
On 23 June 2016, a political earthquake with its epicentre in the UK hit the EU. 
Against all predictions, the British people voted to leave the EU. “Leave’s” victory in 
the referendum was not overwhelming (51.9% against 48.1%) but it was convincing. 
The high turnout (72.2%) assured that there is no room to question the democratic 
legitimacy of  the referendum. 
At the beginning of  the night, practically no one was expecting such a result. Exit 
polls gave a 4% lead to “remain” and Nigel Farage conceded defeat.20 However, a few 
disappointing results in traditionally euro-enthusiastic parts of  the country and a high 
turnout in more conservative ones quickly turned the tide in brexit’s favour.
The referendum’s results broke the UK in two. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
voted “remain” by wide margins whereas Wales and England voted “leave”.21 In the 
aftermath, the Prime Minister David Cameron resigned. Cameron had called the 
referendum as a political move to ensure his re-election, but he did not expect to lose 
it. A petition signed by more than 4 million people requested a second referendum 
on the matter but was quickly rejected by the new cabinet, led by Theresa May.22 A 
decision by the Supreme Court of  the United Kingdom23 requiring the government 
19 Germany, France, Italy and Spain expressed their preference for this solution. See Edouard Pflimlin, 
“Sommet de Versailles: pour une UE à plusieurs vitesses”. Le Monde, March 7, 2017, accessed Mar 
7, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/03/07/sommet-de-versailles-pour-une-ue-a-
plusieurs-vitesses_5090248_3214.html#fbma7QBj0EGrBX1z.99. 
20 See “YouGov poll puts Remain ahead with 52%”, Financial Times, accessed Feb. 25, 2017, https://
www.ft.com/content/d5ef0b36-c642-3f23-8e40-b13903f73815.  
21 See Tim Oliver, “The world after Brexit: From British referendum to global adventure”, International Politics 
53,6 (2016): 689-707. 
22 See “EU Referendum: Results”, BBC News, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/
politics/eu_referendum/results; Nicola Harley, “Brexit: Government rejects petition signed by 
4 million calling for second EU referendum”, The Telegraph, Jul 09, 2016, accessed Mar. 2, 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/09/brexit-government-rejects-petition-for-second-
referendum; Rishi Iyengar, “Britain’s David Cameron Resigns After Vote to Leave E.U.”, Jun. 24, 
2016, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, http://time.com/4381193/david-cameron-resigns-brexit-vote. 
23 See R (on the application of  Miller and Dos Santos) v. Secretary of  State for Exiting the European 
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to get parliamentary approval before triggering Article 50 of  the TEU caused further 
disagreements in UK’s public opinion.24 Some supporters of  Brexit were furious with 
the decision, even calling the judges “enemies of  the people”.25 Following the Court’s 
decision, the House of  Commons approved the European Union (Notification of  
Withdrawal) Bill quickly and by a wide majority. The bill was met with greater opposition 
in the House of  Lords, where it was amended to give Parliament a “meaningful vote” on 
the final deal between the EU and the UK and to ensure the protection of  the rights 
of  the three million EU citizens living in the UK.26 In a stroke of  legislative irony, 
the unelected House of  Lords seems adamant in protecting parliamentary sovereignty 
while the House of  Commons promptly gave the government absolute power. In the 
end, the Lords will probably relent but the amendments might trigger a “parliamentary 
ping-pong” between the Houses and delay the government’s plan to trigger Article 50 by 
the end of  March 2017.
Even if  it is not in the government’s designated timeframe, these internal struggles 
will be overcome. After that, the UK and the EU must negotiate the terms of  their 
separation. It may be an “amicable divorce” where the economic and social effects of  
the UK leaving are reduced by it joining the European Economic Area (EEA). On the 
opposite end of  the spectrum, there is the option of  a hard Brexit with no trade deal 
between the UK and the EU. The UK and the EU would engage in trading according 
to the rules of  the World Trade Organization (WTO). In between these scenarios, in 
abstract, we could also have the “Swiss Model” (EFTA but not EEE), the “Turkish 
Model” (Customs Union) and the option of  building a completely new trade deal.27 
At the time of  writing, the unwillingness of  both parties to compromise on the issue 
of  free movement of  persons points to a hard Brexit. Nevertheless, since negotiations 
have not begun, it is not possible to predict with any degree of  certainty.28
The UK always viewed European integration with a certain degree of  scepticism.29 
Union and associated references, Supreme Court of  the United Kingdom, 2017. 
24 See “Brexit, The Supreme Court (UK) and the principle of  loyalty: on the question of  irrevocability 
of  a withdrawal notice”, Alessandra Silveira, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://officialblogofunio.
com/2017/01/26/brexit-the-supreme-court-uk-and-the-principle-of-loyalty-on-the-question-of-
irrevocability-of-a-withdrawal-notice; “R (Miller) v The Secretary of  State for Exiting the European 
Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin): Realpolitik and the Revocation of  an Article 50 TEU Notification 
to Withdraw”, John Cotter, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://officialblogofunio.com/2016/12/02/r-
miller-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union-2016-ewhc-2768-admin-realpolitik-and-
the-revocation-of-an-article-50-teu-notification-to-withdraw. 
25 See Claire Phipps, “British newspapers react to judges’ Brexit ruling: ‘Enemies of  the people’”, 
The Guardian, Nov. 4, 2016, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-react-judges-brexit-ruling. 
26 See “European Union (Notification of  Withdrawal) Bill 2016-17: Progress of  the Bill”, 
UK Parliament, accessed March 1, 2017, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/
europeanunionnotificationofwithdrawal.html. 
27 See M. Hachula et al, Uncertainty after the Brexit vote: Economic effects and legal aspects (Brussels: European 
Parliament, 2016), accessed Mar. 1, 2017, https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/
upload/cab9f86d-9888-40e6-b2c9-b6418c699fe4/DIW.pdf. 
28 See C. Barnard, “The voters have spoken. Brexit it is”, UNIO EU Law Journal – The Official Blog: 
Thinking & Debating Europe, Ago. 4, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017,  https://officialblogofunio.
com/2016/08/04/the-voters-have-spoken-brexit-it-is/. C. Barnard, A. Ludlow, “Free Movement of  
Services, Migration and Leaving the EU”, National Institute Economic Review, 236, 1 (2016): 23-30. V. 
Bogdanor, “Brexit, the Constitution and the Alternatives”, King’s Law Journal, 27, 3 (2016): 314-322. 
29 See C. Gifford, “The United Kingdom’s Eurosceptic political economy”, The British Journal of  Politics 
and International Relations, 18, 4 (2016): 779-794. A. Glencross, Why the UK Voted for Brexit: David 
Cameron’s Great Miscalculation, (Birmingham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). S. Hobolt, “The Brexit vote: a 
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Several exceptions had to be built in the European legal framework to accommodate 
the UK’s demands. It is not part of  the Eurozone and of  the Schengen Area. British 
scepticism might not be scepticism of  just the EU but also, of  Europeans in general and 
of  immigration.30 Without it, the EU may find it easier to achieve further integration. 
But only if  it can overcome its “existential crisis”, caused by the populist wave that has 
swept across the EU.31
Leaving the biggest trade bloc in the world will surely have economic consequences. 
Since the referendum, the British Pound has been falling against other major currencies. 
At the time of  writing, 1,00£ is worth less than 1,20€ and 1,25$. Before the referendum, 
it was worth 1,30€ and 1,47$. As of  result of  Pound’s decline in value, companies who 
export to the UK had to raise prices. Microsoft’s readjustment of  prices may cost 
millions to taxpayers.32 Unilever also raised Marmite’s prices, causing disputes between 
the manufacturer and some retailers.33 One could argue that a weaker Pound would 
help exports from the UK and thus, reduce Brexit’s negative effects. While it may 
happen in theory, its effect will not probably be enough to counterbalance the negative 
effect that leaving with no deal would have on the economy. In that regard, the initial 
resistance of  the British economy seems to be finally subsiding.34 Nevertheless, we 
should wait for the official negotiations to begin and then make the analysis of  the 
economic effects in both economies.35
Taking back control of  British laws might not be immediately possible. European 
Legislation constitutes a crucial part of  the UK’s legal framework. The British 
government plans on “converting directly effective EU law into UK law, and preserving secondary 
legislation enacted under the ECA”36 amending it in accordance with the country’s needs 
divided nation, a divided continent”, Journal of  European Public Policy, 23, 9 (2016): 1259-1277. T. Oliver, 
“Fifty Shades of  Brexit: Britain’s EU Referendum and its Implications for Europe and Britain”, The 
International Spectator – Italian Journal of  International Affairs, Online first, (2017): 1-11.  
30 See M. Freeden, “Editorial. After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology”, 
Journal of  Political Ideologies, 22, 1, (2017): pp.1-11. J. Matti, Y. Zhou, “The political economy of  Brexit: 
explaining the vote”, Applied Economics Letters, (2016): 1-4. 
31 See R. F. Inglehart, P. Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of  Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural 
Backlash, (Harvard Kennedy School: Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 2016). J. Clarke, J. 
Newman, “People in this country have had enough of  experts’: Brexit and the paradoxes of  populism”, 
Critical Policy Studies, (2017), in press. T. Siczek, M. R. Steenbergen, “Better the devil you know? Risk-
taking, globalization and populism in Great Britain”, European Union Politics, (2017), in press. 
32 See J. Titcomb (2016). “Microsoft to raise prices by up to 22pc after slump in pound”, The Telegraph, 
Oct., 23, 2016, accessed Feb., 27, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/23/micro-
soft-to-lift-prices-up-to-22pc-over-falling-pound/. 
33 See “Morrisons raises Marmite price by 12.5%”, BBC News, Oct. 28, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37801847. 
34 See K. Allen, P. Scruton, “How has the Brexit vote affected the UK economy? February verdict”, 
The Guardian, Feb. 21, 2017, accessed Feb. 27, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-
interactive/2017/feb/22/how-has-the-brexit-vote-affected-the-uk-economy-february-verdict. K. 
Allen, “Brexit economy: inflation surge shows impact of  vote finally beginning to bite”, The Guardian, 
Dec. 21, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/dec/21/brexit-
economy-referendum-inflation-uk-2017. “How has economy fared since Brexit vote?”, BBC, Jan. 17, 
2017, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36956418. 
35 See D. Blagen, “Britain and the world after Brexit”, International Politics, 54, 1 (2017): 1-25. M. Ebell, 
J. Warren, “The Long-Term Economic Impact of  Leaving the EU”, National Institute Economic Review, 
236, 1 (2016): 121-138. C. Hartwelli, R. Horvath, An assessment of  the impact of  Brexit on euro area stability, 
(Brussels: European Parliament, 2016), 7-22. 
36 Elliott, Tierney, “The “Great Repeal Bill” and Delegated Powers”, Public Law for Everyone, Mar. 7, 
2017, accessed Mar. 10, 2017, https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/03/07/the-great-repeal-bill-
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subsequently. This raises a very different issue since “while it is questionable as to whether or 
not there will ever be sufficient time or resources to undertake an adequate scrutiny, it seems that there 
will be plenty of  time for MPs, businesses and interest groups to lobby for the selective amendment or 
repeal of  particular laws”.37 Commerce may suffer even more if  the UK and EU’s legal 
framework deviate too much. As an example, the UK may adopt lower food safety, 
consumer protection or data protection standards.
The EU and its Member States shall also feel deeply the effects of  Brexit. The EU 
will lose about 5% of  its budget and the remaining Member States might have to make 
up for it. The weaker Pound may decrease the purchasing power of  British citizens, 
thus adversely affecting countries that export to the UK. If  there is a hard Brexit, the 
possible re-imposition of  import duties might further complicate the situation.
2.2. Chapter II: Trump comes, sees and conquers
In 2008, Barack Obama, a young and charismatic senator from Illinois, achieved 
a surprising victory over the establishment candidate in the Democratic Party Primary 
elections. Obama lost the popular vote to Hillary Clinton in the Primary, but the 
Democratic Party united around him and he was able to easily defeat John McCain 
to become the 44th President of  the United States. Obama is a brilliant public speaker 
and his message of  hope and the “Yes, We Can” slogan connected with the American 
voter, allowing him to serve two terms in the White House and leave with an unusually 
high approval rating.  
In 2016, Donald J. Trump, a famous billionaire and reality TV star, emerged 
victorious from the Republican Party Primary defeating more experienced candidates 
like Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio. Not unlike Obama, Trump’s message 
connected with its electorate who wished to “Make America Great Again”.38 In the 
and-delegated-powers/. 
37 See Catharine Macmillan, “The Impact of  Brexit upon English Contract Law”, King’s Law Journal 27,3 
(2016): 420-430. 
38 Trump managed to survive a plethora of  political “scandals” that would have sunk most political 
candidates. Trump was accused of  sexism, racism, xenophobia, disrespect for the military veterans and 
connections to the Russian government. However, not only did he survive, but arguably thrived because 
of  the controversy surrounding his campaign. In fact, 42% of  women voted for him, and his results with 
Afro-American / Latino voters were better than Romney’s in 2012. His ability in the political arena also 
exceeded expectations. Jeb Bush, the initial favourite, spent 130 million dollars in campaign but did not win 
any state and was severely damaged by the label of  “no energy” courtesy of  Trump. Similarly, Marco Rubio 
became “Little Marco”, Ted Cruz “Lyin’ Ted” and Hillary Clinton “Crooked Hillary”. Trump’s issues with 
the mainstream media are also widely known. At the time of  writing, he seems to be on the winning side 
of  their dispute, since the most recent polls say that the public trusts him more than the mainstream media. 
Furthermore, they may have involuntarily helped in his election. See Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, 
“Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of  Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash”, Harvard Kennedy School: 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series (2016): 6; Pedro Madeira Froufe, “O insustentável peso democrático 
do populismo: deambulações em torno da União Europeia, de olhos postos em Donald Trump”, in UNIO 
E-book – Volume I: Workshops CEDU 2016, coord. Alessandra Silveira (Braga: CEDU, 2017): 305-315.; 
“Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race, gender, education”, Alec Tyson and Shiva Maniam, accessed 
Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-
by-race-gender-education; “Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women”, Clare Malone, accessed Feb. 27, 
2017, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women; Nicholas Confessore 
and Sarah Cohen, “How Jeb Bush Spent $130 Million Running for President With Nothing to Show for 
It”, New York Times¸ Feb. 22, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/us/
politics/jeb-bush-campaign.html?_r=1; Paola Chavez and Veronica Stracqualursi, “From ‘Crooked Hillary’ 
to ‘Little Marco,’ Donald Trump’s Many Nicknames”, ABC News, May 11, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/crooked-hillary-marco-donald-trumps-nicknames/story?id=39035114; 
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General Election, Trump achieved a surprising victory over Hillary Clinton and thus, 
became the 45th President of  the United States. Like Bush in 2000, Trump won the 
election without winning a majority of  the popular vote.
Trump’s victory surprised most political analysts who did not believe that he could 
win the Republican Primaries much less the Presidential Election. The Huffington 
Post’s Pollster gave him a 1.7% probability of  winning. Nate Silver gave him 28.2% 
and almost every other mainstream analyst followed in between.39 In fact, the unusually 
high chances given to Trump by Nate Silver prompted accusations that he was swaying 
the results of  the polls in Trump’s favour.40 In the end, neither the Huffington Post 
nor Silver’s “FiveThirtyEight” were right. Silver predicted that Trump’s path to victory 
depended on victories in Florida, Nevada, North-Carolina, and New Hampshire (all 
unlikely). However, Trump won in Wisconsin (“FiveThirtyEight” gave him a 15,9% 
probability of  winning there), Michigan (19,7%) and Pennsylvania (22,6%) and lost 
Nevada and New Hampshire.41 In the betting markets, the Irish company Paddy Power 
was so sure of  Clinton’s victory that it paid early to those who betted on her.42
Trump won democratically but why? This question shall occupy political analysts 
for the next few years. The theories regarding the Trump’s success are numerous 
and contradictory. We shall list some: i) “Political Correctness”, also known as the 
“PC Culture”, went too far and thus a counterculture emerged and united behind a 
pragmatic businessman helping him seize victory;43 ii) the Republican Party suffered a 
coup by an outsider; iii) the Russians influenced the elections; iv) the voters from the rural 
communities felt that the mainstream politicians are disconnected from their needs and 
thus decided to elect an outsider; v) the US population is racist, sexist and xenophobic; 
vi) minorities voted in inferior numbers when compared to Obama’s election,  thus 
giving an advantage to the Republican Party; vi) Hillary Clinton was a flawed candidate 
and was not able to bring Bernie Sanders’ supporters to her side when it mattered; vii) 
Wikileaks’ mail leaks helped Trump; viii) the FBI investigation on Clinton’s usage of  a 
Cristiano Lima, “Poll: Trump administration edges media in voter trust”, Feb. 17, 2017, accessed Feb 
27, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-media-trust-poll-fox-news-235168; Julia R. 
Azari, “How the News Media Helped to Nominate Trump. Political Communication”, Political Communication 33, 
4 (2016): 677-680. 
39 See “Polls-Plus Election Forecast”, FiveThirtyEight, Nov. 8, 2016, accessed Feb. 23, 2017, https://
projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/#plus. 
40 See R. Grim, “Nate Silver Is Unskewing Polls — All of  Them — In Trump’s Direction”, Huffington 
Post, Nov. 05, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nate-silver-
election-forecast_us_581e1c33e4b0d9ce6fbc6f7f. 
41 See “Polls-Plus Election Forecast”, FiveThirtyEight, Nov. 8., 2016, accessed Feb. 23, 2017, https://
projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/#plus. 
42 See D. Doyle, “Paddy Power’s $1 Million Gamble Backfires as Trump Upsets Odds”, Bloomberg, Nov. 
9, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-09/paddy-
power-s-1-million-gamble-backfires-as-trump-upsets-odds9/11/2016. 
43 An interesting story about Trump’s pragmatism comes from the improbable of  sources. In 2007, 
Vince McMahon – the husband of  the Administrator of  the Small Business Administration Linda 
McMahon – invited Trump to the biggest wrestling show on the world: Wrestlemania. Before the 
show, Vince asked Trump if  we would allow the wrestler “Stone Cold Steve Austin” to hit him with a 
“Stone Cold Stunner”, a wrestling move that targets the neck. After being assured that it would delight 
the crowd, Trump promptly accepted, ignoring the protests of  his assistant. When reading this story 
one should not forget that even if  wrestling is scripted injuries are usual and serious. Furthermore, 
Trump was a sexagenarian and not a trained athlete. See Tom Sheen, “‘OK, I’LL DO IT’ How 
Donald Trump was convinced to take a Stone Cold Stunner by WWE supremo Vince McMahon”, 
The Sun, Jan. 21, 2017, accessed Feb. 24, 2017, https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/2670864/donald-
trump-stone-cold-stunner-wrestlemania-wwe-vince-mcmahon/. 
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personal server for governmental purposes and James Comey’s declarations derailed 
her campaign. At the time of  writing, no consensus has been reached and, since the 
issue is still sensitive in the American society, no consensus will be reached until proper 
historical detachment is possible.
In his campaign, Trump criticised mega-regional trade agreements that are, in 
his opinion, responsible for “stealing” American jobs.44 In his first week as President, 
he withdrew the USA from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).45 The USA was 
the biggest economy in the trade agreement and the main political force behind it.46 
Without it, TPP’s chances of  survival are slim. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU (representing 46% of  the World’s 
GDP) will probably, at the least, suffer significant delays. The TTIP also faces 
criticism in the EU47 since Greenpeace leaked some secret documents related to its 
negotiations.48 European consumers are worried that the TTIP might degrade food 
safety, environmental standards49 and workers’ rights50 in the name of  free trade.51 The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as promised by Trump, will be 
renegotiated.52
The Trump Administration wants to reduce the burden of  “excessive” regulation 
on companies. Such reduction shall entail environmental deregulation and deregulation 
of  the financial system. Despite only being in the first few months of  the Trump 
administration, the President already signed executive orders related to these issues.53 
44 See S. A. Miller, “Trump vows to cancel Asia trade deal as president — and puts NAFTA on notice”, 
Washington Times, Jun. 28, 2016, accessed Feb. 27, 2017. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/
jun/28/donald-trump-vows-to-cancel-trans-pacific-partners/. 
45 See D. J. Trump, “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of  the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement”, The White House, Jan. 23, 2017, accessed Feb. 27, 
2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-
withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific. 
46 See D. Hamilton, “America’s Mega-Regional Trade Diplomacy: Comparing TPP and TTIP”, The 
International Spectator – Italian Journal of  International Affairs, 49, 1, (2014): 81-97. J. Wilson, “Mega-
Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing Between the TPP and RCEP?”, Journal of  
Contemporary Asia, 45, 2, (2014): 345-353. 
47 See F. De Ville, G. Siles-Brügge, “Why TTIP is a game-changer and its critics have a point”, Journal 
of  European Public Policy, Online first (2016): 1-15. 
48 See Greenpeace, 2016, accessed 27 Feb. 27, 2017, https://ttip-leaks.org/. 
49 See M. Karlsson, “TTIP and the environment: the case of  chemicals policy”, Global Affairs¸1, 1, 
(2015): 21-31. 
50 See A. Tyc, “Workers’ rights and transatlantic trade relations: The TTIP and beyond”, The Economic 
and Labour Relations Review, 28,1, (2017): 113-128. 
51 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was rejected by the European Parliament in 
2012, after protests across the EU erupted due to the restrictions that the agreement would imposed 
on the European’s freedom of  expression and right to privacy. As a rule, European consumers are 
against the sacrifice of  their personal freedoms in the name of  free trade. See Andreas Dür and 
Gemma Mateo, “Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement”, Journal of  European Public Policy 24,8 (2014): 1199-1217. 
52 See A. Rascoe, “Trump to begin renegotiating NAFTA pact soon with Mexico, Canada”, Reuters, 
Jan. 22, 2017, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nafta-idUSK-
BN156128. 
53 See “Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs”, Donald 
J. Trump, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/
presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling; “Presidential Executive Order on 
Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda”, Donald J. Trump, accessed Feb 27, 2017, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/24/presidential-executive-order-enforcing-regulatory-
reform-agenda; “Presidential Executive Order on Restoring the Rule of  Law, Federalism, and 
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Trump also promised a one trillion-dollar (1012$) infrastructure plan.54 These promises 
were received with enthusiasm by the financial markets, that are negotiating at record 
values.55 Other campaign promises from Trump may also affect the world’s economy, 
like Trump’s adversarial posture in relation to China56 and the ban on travellers 
from six (originally seven)57 Muslim-majority nations that are considered a threat to 
national security. Regarding the EU’s internal integrity, Trump’s support of  Brexit and 
his apparent hostility against the EU and its leaders, and his declarations on NATO 
classifying it as obsolete followed by demands for further investment in defence from 
the allies caused discomfort amidst the European leaders.58 In response, the EU appears 
to be planning for a greater degree of  military cooperation, in what could ultimately 
result in the creation of  the European Army.59 With the UK leaving the EU it may be 
easier to achieve this goal since: i) France is now the only relevant military power in the 
EU and thus, it may be needed to safeguard the Union’s safety; ii) the UK was always 
sceptic to the implementation of  common defence policy.60
3. Overcoming the existential crisis: a new chapter for the EU 
The EU never managed to completely overcome the collective trauma caused by 
the 2008 financial crisis. For one part, the economic recuperation was not as successful 
as in the US. The credibility of  the EU’s institutions was also seriously damaged.61
Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of  the United States” Rule”, Donald J. Trump, accessed 
March 1, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/presidential-executive-
order-restoring-rule-law-federalism-and-economic. 
54 See Aric Jenkins, “President Trump Again Called for $1 Trillion on Infrastructure — Without 
Many Details”, Fortune, Mar. 1, 2017, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/02/28/trump-
congress-address-infrastructure-investment. 
55 See Caroline Valetkevitch, “Dow hits 12th record high close; Trump talks up infrastructure 
spending”, Reuters, Feb. 27, 2017, accessed Feb. 28, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
stocks-idUSKBN1661KL. 
56 See E. Luce, “Donald Trump’s collision course with China”, Financial Times, Dec. 18, 2016, accessed 
Feb. 27, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/5d9df7d4-c3c3-11e6-81c2-f57d90f6741a. 
57 The original executive order was replaced after a plethora of  judicial challenges and defeats in State 
and Federal courts. The United States District Court for the Western District of  Washington issued 
a temporary restraining order suspending its application and The United States Court of  Appeals for 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision. At the time of  writing, it is expected that the same States will 
challenge the new executive order on similar grounds, with support from Oregon, New York and 
Massachusetts. See, “Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The 
United States”, Donald J. Trump, accessed Mar. 6, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states; State of  
Washington v. Donald J. Trump [2017] (The United States District Court for the Western District of  
Washington).; State of  Washington v. Donald J. Trump [2017] (The United States Court of  Appeals 
for The Ninth Circuit); 
58 See J. Masters, K. Hunt, “Trump rattles NATO with ‘obsolete’ blast”, CNN, Jan. 17, 2017, accessed 
Feb. 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-
takeaways/. 
59 See J. Barigazzi, “EU backs greater military cooperation”, Politico, Nov. 15, 2016, accessed Feb. 
24, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-backs-greater-military-cooperation-nato-donald-trump-
federica-mogherini/. 
60 See S. Besch, EU defence, Brexit and Trump: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, (London: Centre for 
European Reform, 2016). 
61 In the span of  9 years, the confidence rating in the European institutions dropped from double 
digit positive values to negative values. In 2007, the European Parliament had a confidence rating of  
+28, the Commission +24 and the Council of  the European Union +19. In 2010, it had dropped to 
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The Commission’s “White Paper” might as well be called The Commission’s “Blank 
Paper” since it lists five fictional scenarios but no single solution for the very real issue 
in the EU. In fact, when reading the White Paper, an old classic from Italian Cinema 
comes to mind.62 In Aprile, a semi-documental film from the Italian filmmaker Nanni 
Moretti, the main character (also played by Nanni Moretti) watches the 1996 Italian 
General Election televised debate between Silvio Berlusconi and Massimo D’Alema, 
the leader of  the PDS. “Berlusconi is attacking D’ Alema whose passiveness and self-
control prompt Moretti to lose his patience and shout at the television: ‘D’ Alema, 
di qualcosa, reagisci!”.63 Reading the “White Paper” incites the same reaction from the 
European citizen. An institution with the political influence and responsibility of  the 
Commission should “say something, react”!
In May 2017, the French go to the polls in the Presidential elections. The 
Eurosceptic candidate Marine Le Pen is an almost certain lock for disputing the second 
round of  the elections. Even if  it is unlikely that she will ultimately achieve victory, 
the same was said of  Donald Trump. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ PVV might 
become the largest political party in the Tweede Kamer (lower chamber of  the Dutch 
Parliament). While it is almost certain that PVV will not be able to form a government 
because they will not achieve the required majority and do not have the support of  
other parties,64 such a result should be cautiously noted. In Germany, the dispute will 
be between Merkel’s CDU and Schulz SPD, none of  them being an immediate risk to 
European integrity. Even so, AfD’s evolution in recent years is worrisome.65 In Italy, 
Beppe Grillo’s M5S was one of  the largest contributors to the defeat of  government’s 
proposal in the constitutional referendum and the subsequent resignation of  the Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi. From the analysis done of  the referendum in the UK and the 
American Presidential election it can be submitted that the political forces that wish 
for the disintegration of  the EU have a lot of  defects, but no one needs to tell them 
“di qualcosa, reagisci!”.
Now is the time to reform the EU. If  we wait any longer, there might be no 
turning back. The most powerful European politics cannot keep watching, in apathy, 
the ongoing disintegration of  the EU. The confidence of  the citizens in the European 
institutions must be won again and this will not be possible unless the current 
organisation of  the institutions is also reformed, as we and the referred resolutions of  
+11 for the Parliament, +9 for the Commission and +5 for the Council of  the European Union. In 
2016, the value was of  -6 for the Parliament and -8 for the Commission, with no data published for the 
Council of  the European Union. See “Eurobarometer 68 – Public Opinion in the European Union”, 
European Commission, accessed Mar. 1, 2017; http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/
archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf; “Eurobarometer 73 – Public Opinion in the European Union”, 
European Commission, accessed Mar 1, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/
eb73/eb73_vol1_en.pdf; “Eurobarometer 85 – Public Opinion in the European Union”, European 
Commission, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.
cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/75977. 
62 See Aprile. (1998). [DVD] Italy: Nanni Moretti. 
63 See G. Bonsaver, “The egocentric Cassandra of  the left: Representations of  politics in the films of  
Nanni Moretti”, The Italianist, 21,1 (2011): 158-183.  
64 See R. Korteweg, “Double Dutch: Why Wilders Wins, Even If  He Stays Out of  Government”, 
Centre for European Reform. Mar. 3, 2017, accessed March 3, 2017, https://www.cer.org.uk/insights/
double-dutch-why-wilders-wins-even-if-he-stays-out-government. 
65 Even if  the party seems to be losing support and donations in the aftermath of  Björn Höcke’s 
declarations on the Holocaust. See Severin Weiland, “AfD sinkt in Umfragen. Angst bei den 
Angstmachern”, Der Spiegel, Feb. 27, 2017, accessed Feb 27, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/
deutschland/afd-brandbrief-der-afd-landeschefs-an-die-basis-a-1136479. 
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the European Parliament suggested above. If  doing so entails a revision of  European 
Constitutional law, (the TUE and TFUE) then so be it. 
There is no future in an “economic giant” that is simultaneously a “political 
dwarf ”.66
66 F. Quadros, Direito da União Europeia, (3rd ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2013): 717. 
